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Introduction 
Scholarly work on urban leadership is probably as old as research on cities itself. At the same 
time, the perception of city leaders’ most relevant policy priorities regarding the main 
challenges and goals for the further development of cities have changed quite often. Yet even 
if urban regime theorists raised the issue of a wide range of possible policy agendas that can 
be pursued by city leaders together with a broad range of actors from business and civil 
society, most studies of the 1990s and early 2000s focused on cities and elite cooperation that 
had economic growth as the primary target of city development.  
Whereas cities in the increasingly urbanised world are central to the creation of 
prosperity, it is also clear that even the wealthiest cities, including the so-called ‘global cities’, 
are nowadays facing rising socio-economic inequalities and challenges for integrating 
increasing flows of international immigration (for references, see Hambleton 2015, 4, or 
Fainstein 1010). Concurrently, globalisation has also led to increasing competition between 
cities at the national and global scale. It is thus questionable, whether city leaders have 
sufficient room to manoeuvre for choosing such social-centred priorities over market-centred 
priorities of urban development. Savitch and Kantor (2002) note that “Cities need not to be 
leaves in the wind” and emphasise the importance of urban leaders for mobilising broad 
political and public support within their municipality as well as financial support by higher 
state levels. Hambleton, in his book Leading the Inclusive City, draws the same conclusion: 
Cities are not just “helpless victims in a global process of economic exploitation designed to 
serve the capital needs” (Hambleton 2015, xii). What is needed, in his view, is strategic and 
cooperative leadership at the intersections between the political sphere, civil society and 
business interests. 
In this paper we want to instigate the prospects of such visionary leadership for 
reaching a more just and more inclusive city. Based on a recent survey on Swiss mayors in 
Switzerland which is part of a broader survey of European mayors, we want to find out how 
mayoral leadership styles correspond to policy agendas that can be linked to socially just and 
inclusive cities. 
We first give an overview over the theory regarding urban leadership and the just 
and inclusive city. Then we comment on the data and measures used, before reporting our 
empirical findings on the mayoral agendas in Switzerland and the predispositions for 
reaching an inclusive city in terms of mayoral leadership styles. We conclude with a 
discussion of the findings. 
Theory: Leading the Inclusive City 
City leadership is not a new topic among urban scholars. The power, interests, and 
leadership styles of mayors are part of scholarly writing at least since the community power 
debate of the 1960s (see, e.g. Bierschenk 2003; Dahl 1961; Hunter 1953), and gained new 
momentum in the 1990s with the rise of the urban regime approach (see, e.g. Mossberger and 
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Stoker 2001; Stone 1989). Most writings of urban regime theorists focus on various cities’ 
growth agendas (see among others Crivelli and Dlabac 2006; Devecchi 2012; Digaetano and 
Klemanski 1993; Dowding et al. 1999; Hamilton 2002). It is however less well known that 
Clarence Stone was not only the leading founder of urban regime theory, but also one of the 
first urban scholars linking city leadership with political agendas that prioritise 
“environmental protection, historic preservation, affordable housing, (...) and linkage funds 
for various social purposes” (Stone 1993, 19) or agendas focusing on the expansion of lower 
class opportunities as enriched education and job trainings, better public transportation 
access and easier opportunities to start small businesses and home ownership. These all are 
political aims that went by more or less unnoticed by many scholars of the late 1990s and 
early 2000s working on city leadership and urban regimes, but are actually easily 
comparable to contemporary writing on just and inclusive cities (Fainstein 2009, 2010; 
Hambleton 2015; Harvey 1996, 2012; Marcuse et al. 2009; Soja 2010). 
Fainstein’s (2010) approach focuses on the ‘Just City’ as an analytical concept, but also 
as a political tool to lead and plan the Just City. Fainstein departs from a Rawlsian liberal 
concept of justice and discusses its applicability in the context of urban planning at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century in the wealthy, Western world. Equity, as her preferred 
criterion of justice, then refers to “a distribution of both material and nonmaterial benefits 
derived from public policy that does not favour those who are already better off at the 
beginning” (Fainstein 2010, 36). As this approach to justice can be criticized for being too 
individualistic, Fainstein supplements the criterion of equity with the poststructuralist 
criterion of recognition, giving attention to group differences that go beyond social classes 
and encompass race, ethnicity, gender, religion, and culture. She agrees with Iris M. Young 
that “group differentiation is both an inevitable and desirable aspect of modern social 
processes”, and that “social justice … requires not the melting away of differences, but 
institutions that promote reproduction of and respect for group differences without 
oppression” (cited in Fainstein 2010, 43). Fainstein then amplifies her concept of justice by 
Sen and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. Necessary capabilities for the development of 
each individual encompass non-tradable and consciously valued (if not used) opportunities 
regarding quality of life, health, bodily integrity, access to education and control over one’s 
political and material environment (Fainstein 2010, 55).  
For the assessment and guidance of Just City planning and policies, Fainstein (2010, 
68-82) proposes a series of substantive criteria in a range of policy domains (also see 
Carpenter, Dlabac, and Zwicky 2015). With regards to housing policies she problematizes US 
urban sprawl caused by incentives for house ownership and stigmatisation of low-income 
occupants in public housing, pleading for the more recent trend towards mixed-income 
developments and non-profit or cooperative forms of housing in the case of Europe. More 
generally, she observes repetitive conflicts between growth and equity, as is often 
exemplified in the field of urban regeneration and zoning policies: ‘downtown versus the 
neighbourhoods’, ‘demolition versus preservation’, ‘community stability versus population 
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change’, ‘subsidized sports facilities versus investments in social housing, education, or 
community facilities’, ‘expressways versus public transit’. 
Taking into account Fainstein’s approach on just cities, Hambleton (2015), in his 
analysis of leadership focuses on the concept of the ‘Inclusive City’. He wishes to expand 
Fainstein’s work with the focus on social justice through notions of environmental justice and 
sustainability (Hambleton 2015, 21-25). According to Hambletons definition, inclusive cities 
are cities that are pushing forward eco-friendly policies and approaches, as well as being 
cities that are people-friendly and that take advantage of diversity (Hambleton 2015, xiv). 
Hambleton additionally criticises the contemporary praise of ‘smart cities’ as sustainable, 
technologically advanced alternatives to cities that prioritise economic growth. Being smart 
is, according to Hambleton, not enough to achieve social integration, environmental justice 
and sustainability; it is thus necessary to develop ‘wise cities’ (Hambleton 2015, xiv/283). 
In order to address pressing societal and environmental challenges, inclusive cities 
need, following Hambleton’s argumentation, not so much managers for preserving and 
incrementally improving public services, as was the case under large public administrations 
and remains the case after outsourcing public services and introducing New Public 
Management techniques (Hambleton 2015, 58-63). In the context of the shift from 
government to ‘governance’, where responsibility for collective provision of services is 
diffused across a variety of public, private, and community and voluntary sector bodies, 
radical change in the kind and organisation of public services instead requires “bold, 
forward looking leadership” (Hambleton 2015: 11). “Out goes the notion of the ‘city boss’ 
determining policies and priorities; in comes the ‘facilitative leader’ orchestrating the efforts 
of multiple actors” (Hambleton 2015, 11). Thereby city leadership stems from three relevant 
groups: 1) political leaders (mayor and politicians), 2) civil society leaders and 3) 
business/economic leaders. Productive spaces of innovation result where these three spheres 
of leadership overlap (Hambleton 2015, 125). Effective leaders must therefore reach out and 
cooperate with stakeholders from the other relevant spheres (Hambleton 2015, 124) – an 
approach that is in strong accordance with earlier urban regime writings.  
Summing up Hambleton’s argument, city mayors that want to engage in political 
decisions leading to an inclusive and wiser city need to have a clear policy strategy and have 
to be inclusive in a cooperative way. Hambleton (2015) highlights innovative ‘inclusive city’-
projects that show the potential of a democratic, cooperative and strategic city leadership in 
17 cities around the globe. Rather than only looking at positive examples, where cooperative 
and strategic leadership advances the inclusive city, we are interested whether such 
leadership is also more generally associated with the goals of a more inclusive and more just 
city. More specifically, we focus on the political sphere of urban leadership.  
To do so, we take advantage of Getimis’ and Hlepas’ (2006) work. According to them, 
and following a wide strand of literature on political leadership (see further Barber 1977; 
John and Cole 1999), the core dimensions of leadership style refer to the leadership 
predispositions and the leaders attitudes towards the exercise of power. The first dimension 
“reflects the way in which leaders envisage their role” (Getimis and Hlepas 2006, 179), 
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resulting in the dichotomy between ‘strategic’ and ‘reproductive’ leadership styles. Strategic 
city leaders hence develop and pursue distinctive and novel policy agendas and try to 
institutionalise them in the city’s policy making. Reproductive mayors do not design long-
term agenda goals, and tend rather to orient themselves at the reproduction of ideas that are 
already present in the administration. The second dimension of leadership that is geared 
towards the attitudes towards the way mayoral power is exercised leads to another 
dichotomy – namely towards a ‘cooperative’ and an ‘authoritarian’ style of leadership. 
Whereas cooperative leaders try to mobilise as much community support as needed to “get 
the municipal work done, (...) authoritarian leaders are characterised by a top down 
approach of command and control” (Getimis and Hlepas 2006, 181).  
 
Figure 1: Four Ideal leadership styles (Source: Getimis/Hlepas 2006: 182, based on John/Cole 1999) 
 Leadership orientation 
Reproductive Strategic 
 
 
Exercise of 
power 
 
Cooperative 
 
Consensus Facilitator 
 
 
Visionary 
 
 
Authoritarian 
 
Protector 
 
 
City Boss 
 
 
Following John and Cole (1999) and combining these two dimensions, Getimis and Hlepas 
(2006, 182-183) create a typology that includes four different ideal leadership styles (see 
Figure 1): 
1. ‘Visionary leadership’: Visionary mayors act pro-active, are change oriented, and mostly 
belong to a long-lasting leadership period based on powerful and effective coalitions. 
2. ‘Consensus Facilitator leadership’: Consensual mayors lead in an open way that makes it 
possible to incorporate agenda aims introduced by their cooperation partners. The 
establishment of long lasting strategies can somewhat be challenging for such mayors, 
because third-party agenda aims can change rapidly.  
3. ‘City Boss leadership’: City boss mayors are characterised mainly by their unilateral 
decisions concerning the local policy agenda that bases on strategic and long-term 
visions. Such leaders use the mayoral power vested in the politico-administrative system. 
4. ‘Protector leadership’: Protective mayors do not aim to participate in cooperative 
coalitions and tend to show problems in coping with policy changes. Maintaining the 
status quo is the most important issue for such mayors. 
 
Even though strategy and cooperation – as also included in Hambleton’s (2015) approach on 
‘Inclusive Cities’ – are two well-known concepts among scholars working on urban 
leadership, Getimis and Hlepas (2006, 178, emphasis by the authors) refer to a “knowledge 
gap regarding the policy outcomes of enacted leadership”. Our literature review has not 
6 
 
revealed any advancement in this regard since then. Most of the already realised studies 
focus on institutional or personal factors that result in different leadership styles, but not in 
policy outcomes. We thus try to fill this gap with our analysis on Swiss cities. As the data 
available does not allow us to account for actual policy outputs and outcomes, the focus on 
self-reported mayoral agendas can already produce important insights.  
What then do we expect from these theoretical statements? Which leadership styles 
could serve as a predisposition to a mayoral agenda towards inclusive Swiss cities? Taking 
into account Hambleton’s (2015) argumentation of the need for cooperative and strategic 
leadership leading to ‘wise’ cities, it would be visionary mayors that engage most in policy 
agendas that can be linked to the ‘Inclusive City’. Getimis and Hlepas (2006) also point at 
visionary leaders that are more prone to innovative policies than leaders of all other types. 
On the opposite, protective mayors can be assumed to be the most likely antagonists towards 
inclusive and eco-friendly agenda goals. This assumption is not taken because such mayors 
do not want to implement such goals in general, but rather because they are not engaging in 
either strategic or cooperative ways of even thinking about such agenda goals to be 
important for their cities.  
Important to notice is the quite probable possibility of visionary mayors that act in a 
strategic and cooperative way, but are not geared towards policy agendas that could be the 
basis for ‘Inclusive Cities’. When considering the vast amount of scholarly work on urban 
regimes as successful cases for the establishment of economic development agendas, 
Hambleton’s (2015) positive examples tend to draw a too optimistic picture. Hambleton 
himself opens his book with the acknowledgement that it may have a “bias for hope” 
(Hambleton 2015, 3). Indeed, he has selected inspiring cases of mayoral city leadership 
fostering social and eco-friendly projects, i.e. policies and projects that are typically at the 
heart of inclusive cities. Visionary mayors with stronger ties to private capital and economic 
growth agendas can however use their shared power of public, civic, and private leadership 
to enact agenda goals and implement policies that prioritise for example gated community 
housing over social housing projects, special economic areas and their profit possibilities 
over innovative and green industrial parks, or lower taxes for the well-off over redistributive 
and integrative social measures. Such agendas and policies can lead to the opposite of what 
Hambleton has in mind when talking about inclusive cities, because they can lead to even 
more exclusionary cities, degraded areas, inequalities of life chances and consequently a 
worse quality of life for many inhabitants. 
Data and Method 
Getimis and Hlepas (2006) based their empirical assessment of urban leadership styles across 
twenty European countries on the European Mayor Survey conducted in 2004. Switzerland 
stood out there as one of the countries where the mayors – who are directly elected by the 
citizens, together with their colleagues in the collegial executive – most often displayed 
consensual traits (Getimis and Hlepas 2006, 186). 
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Our paper builds on the second wave of the European Mayor Survey that is currently being 
conducted in 30 European countries (2015-2016), but for which we have already succeeded to 
collect the Swiss data. We contacted all cities with more than 10’000 inhabitants or being 
members of the Association of Swiss Cities (Schweizerischer Städteverband) and received 
answers from 112 mayors out of 167 (response rate: 67%). 
For assessing the leadership styles of Swiss mayors, we followed Getimis and Hlepas 
(2006) approach and where possible we used the same items for calculating the mayoral 
attitudes on the reproductive-strategic and on the authoritarian-cooperation dimension (see 
appendix II, Q1). For the first dimension we thus included four items covering whether 
mayors set goals for transforming the administrative structure, and if they ensure the 
correctness of the political-administrative process (reproductive); and whether mayors 
encourage new projects in the community, and if mayors guide the staff in day to day 
activities (both strategic). For the latter dimension we had to rely on only two rather than 
four items: We included the items covering whether mayors foster the cooperation with the 
neighbouring municipalities (cooperative), and whether they manage the implementation of 
his/her personal policy choices (authoritarian). Arguably, these two items capture the central 
meaning of the dimension (cooperation vs. implementing personal policy agenda), even 
without taking into account Getimis and Hlepas (2006: 181) additional items that cover the 
questions whether authoritarian mayors were likely to give priority to ‘formal power and 
authority’, and whether cooperative mayors prefer to motivate their staff through 
commendation and reward. Additionally, the dimensions were dichotomised by using the 
average of the Swiss mayors as cleavage point. 
Since the measures for leadership style say little about the interaction specifically 
with citizens and groups, we complement these measures by using the mayors’ indication of 
time spend at meetings with these actors as a share of hours spent at other activities 
(appendix II, Q9). 
For the dependent variable regarding the inclusive city agenda, we equally relied on 
the indications given by the mayors (Q3). Since some mayors might have given high 
priorities across the board of possible agenda priorities, while others were more restrictive, 
we opted for a standardisation by calculating the percentual weight a mayor gave to the 
single agenda priorities. 
Since mayoral agenda priorities will heavily depend on the political position of a 
mayor, we also revert to the mayoral self-positioning between left and right (appendix II). 
For constructing subsamples based on political orientation, we used values from zero to six 
for centre-left, whereas seven to 10 was coded as an orientation towards the political right 
position. 
As further conditioning variables we used the mayoral assessment of the financial 
situation (Q14) as well as structural data on population size and type of municipality (core 
city vs. other types) from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. 
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The Mayoral Political Agenda in Swiss Cities 
The evaluation of the policy agendas shows that Swiss city mayors are in general not so 
much concerned about topics regarding the just and inclusive city (figure 2). Even centre-left 
mayors (left panel) give more priority to stimulating economic growth and employment, 
improve communal infrastructure and increasing the attractiveness of the municipality for 
business and living, than to social policies, integration and environment. Still, compared to 
right-wing mayors (right panel) they are clearly more preoccupied with these latter 
priorities, unsurprisingly the gap being largest with regard to integration. 
 
Figure 2: Political agenda of Swiss city mayors, centre-left vs. right political orientation, 2015 
 
(Remarks: Individual mayors could ascribe each item a priority from 1 to 5. These values were 
standardised for each mayor item to represent the share of priority points from the total of points 
ascribed by a particular mayor. Values shown represent the respective average share of priority across 
all mayors with centre-left respectively right political orientation.) 
 
Interesting differences based on the political standing of mayors can also be found in the 
particular field of housing policies (figure 3). Centre-left mayors are more spread on the 
question whether markets are the best way for attending housing needs, but they tend to be 
indecisive or even contradict such an assumption. Right-wing mayors, in contrast, generally 
agree to the statement. 
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Figure 3: Agreement with the sentence “The market is the best way to attend housing needs”, centre-left vs. 
right-wing Swiss mayors, 2015 
 
Leadership Styles Associated with the Inclusive City Agenda 
Before turning to the empirical analysis of the relationship between leadership styles and the 
inclusive city agenda, let us map the Swiss cities in terms of mayoral leadership styles (figure 
4). The Swiss average value is indicated with the vertical and horizontal reference lines in the 
figure. Since we use these values as thresholds for assigning the Swiss cities to the fourfold 
typology of leadership styles, we find the visionary cities in the top right quadrant, clockwise 
followed by the cities governed by a city boss, a protector, or a consensus facilitator. The 
comparison of the subset of cities governed by centre-left as compared to right-wing mayors 
shows that mayors at both sides of the political spectrum pursue all different types of 
leadership styles, with no clear pattern in that regard (the darker the dots, the more cities 
expose these precise values). 
When turning to the statistical regressions of agenda priorities on leadership styles 
(table 1), we would first like to highlight the important role of the mayor’s political 
orientations, confirming our observations from figure 3. Mayors leaning towards the right 
clearly tend to give economic growth a higher priority than their more leftist colleagues 
(model 4). They are also more convinced about the marked solving their housing needs, 
whereas mayors leaning more towards the left are more sceptical of these views (model 5). In 
contrast, centre-left mayors are significantly more concerned with developing social policies, 
social integration, and preserving the environment (models 1-3). If we want to estimate the 
effect of leadership styles, it is thus crucial to control for this variable. The effects found are 
then to be interpreted under the ceteris paribus condition, i.e. it holds for mayors and cities 
with similar traits. In this vein, we can also see that financially better situated cities tend to 
give less importance to growth and the prevalence of market mechanisms when it comes to 
housing. 
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Figure 4: Swiss city mayors on the two-dimensional map for leadership styles 
 
 
With regard to leadership styles, contrary to the general expectation, we found that in the 
Swiss context visionary mayors cannot be associated with agendas towards inclusive cities. 
Quite to the contrary, it is the city boss and the consensus facilitator, who set themselves 
apart from visionary leaders by supporting inclusive city priorities. In our models, we 
therefore use the visionary leadership style as reference category and check what it means 
for the city agenda to be less cooperative (city boss), less strategic (consensus facilitator), or 
neither cooperative nor strategic (protector). 
On the one hand side, it is the consensus facilitator mayors who - ceteris paribus - tend 
to prioritise policy agendas geared towards integration (model 2), significantly more so than 
visionary mayors (reference category). This means that they prioritise integrating ethnic, 
religious and cultural minorities and fostering diversity and tolerance goals over other issues 
such as public safety, preserving the local identity, expanding local infrastructure or 
addressing politico-administrative issues – agenda goals which are not primarily connected 
to the ideal of inclusive and just cities. An even stronger predictor of an integration-friendly 
agenda is the reported time share a mayor spends at meetings with citizens and groups. A 
closer look at the subsamples of centre-left and rightist mayors (see additional regression 
table in appendix I, model 3-4) reveals that it is particularly right-wing mayors who are more 
sensitised when they are in close contact with citizen groups. While this effect holds for 
integration policies, with regard to the other domains we find no evidence for an effect of 
citizen interaction. We can however find an additional effect for centre-left mayors with 
regard to social policies, and it is again the consensual leadership style having positive 
impact (see appendix I, model 1). For centre-left mayors, a consensual leadership style thus 
not only favours a focus on integration, but also on securing social policies more broadly, 
such as housing, education, and carrying for vulnerable groups in general. 
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Table 1: Regression analysis for the mayoral agenda 
 
Dependent variable: 
 
Social policies Integration Environment Econ. growth Housing 
 
OLS OLS OLS OLS logistic 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
y> =Disagree 
    
1.7 
     
(3.1) 
y> =Neither agree nor disagree 
    
0.4 
     
(3.1) 
y> =Agree 
    
-1.3 
     
(3.1) 
y> =Strongly agree 
    
-3.8 
     
(3.2) 
Leadership style:      
 City Boss 1.3 0.9 -0.2 -2.9*** -1.3* 
 
(1.0) (0.8) (0.9) (0.9) (0.8) 
 Consensus facilitator 0.9 1.2* 1.0 -0.9 -0.1 
 
(0.8) (0.7) (0.8) (0.8) (0.6) 
 Protector 0.2 0.4 0.2 -0.9 0.2 
 
(0.8) (0.6) (0.7) (0.7) (0.6) 
 Visionary (reference category)      
Meetings with citizens / groups 0.01 0.1** -0.003 -0.02 0.02 
 
(0.1) (0.05) (0.1) (0.1) (0.04) 
Left-right self-positioning (0-10) -0.4** -0.5*** -0.4** 0.2* 0.5*** 
 
(0.2) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) 
Good financial situation 0.6 0.2 0.6 -1.2** -1.0** 
 
(0.6) (0.5) (0.6) (0.6) (0.5) 
Core city -0.9 0.3 0.3 1.3** -0.2 
 
(0.7) (0.5) (0.6) (0.6) (0.5) 
Population (ln) 0.3 0.2 -0.03 0.4 -0.2 
 
(0.4) (0.3) (0.4) (0.3) (0.3) 
German-speaking -0.8 0.8 -0.2 -0.3 1.2** 
 
(0.7) (0.6) (0.7) (0.7) (0.5) 
Constant 10.2** 8.3*** 12.4*** 7.8** 
 
 
(4.0) (3.1) (3.7) (3.7) 
 
Observations 78 78 78 78 81 
R2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 
Adjusted R2 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 
 
Residual Std. Error (df = 68) 2.5 2.0 2.3 2.3 
 
F Statistic (df = 9; 68) 1.9* 4.0*** 1.7 2.6** 
 
chi2 
    
39.6*** (df = 9) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Cities led by city bosses, on the other hand, show a tendency to set political agendas that are 
less concerned with economic growth (see Table 1, model 4). At the same time, city bosses 
also seem to be less convinced that the market can solve the most important housing issues 
(model 5). Compared to other leaders, city bosses thus seem to be less inclined to 
subordinate their agenda to the logic of national and international market competition, and 
they thus take a more positive stance towards local political intervention for attending 
housing needs (e.g. public/cooperative housing), which is pretty much in accordance to the 
Just City agenda. When we again look at our subsamples (see appendix I, model 9), we 
observe that it is mainly the centre-left city bosses driving the negative effect on ‘free housing 
markets’. Interestingly, with regard to the economic growth priority, the effect seems to be 
mainly driven the right-wing city bosses (model 8). These take a significantly more relaxed 
view on the growth imperative as compared to their right-wing colleagues displaying other 
styles of leadership. 
Conversely, and against the hopes nurtured by Hambleton (2015), visionary mayors 
combining both cooperative and strategic traits give significantly less priority to integration 
than consensual mayors that are cooperative but are more oriented towards reproduction 
than strategic change. Together with consensual and protective leaders, visionary leaders are 
clearly more supportive of stimulating growth and leaving housing needs to be solved by the 
market as compared to city bosses (models with city boss style as reference category not 
reported here). Lastly, mayors exemplifying the protector leadership style, besides being pro-
growth like their consensual and visionary colleagues, stand out in their particular reliance 
on the market for attending housing needs (models with city boss style as reference category 
not reported here). 
 To sum up, rather than finding evidence for the visionary leadership style to be more 
conducive to the inclusive city, we found that the more reproductive orientation of the 
consensual facilitator has a positive impact on priorities geared towards integration and 
social services, whereas city bosses tend to be less growth- and market-oriented. Different 
styles thus priorising different aspects of the just and inclusive city. No evidence could be 
found, however, for a superiority of any leadership style with regards to environmental 
goals, the aspect that Hableton (2015) wished to include to his concept of an ‘Inclusive City’. 
Discussion: Cooperative or Strategic Leadership towards Inclusive 
Cities? 
In the introduction, we set out with the notion that city leadership styles and urban political 
agendas are commonly investigated as one ensemble. Yet we observed the relative absence 
of empirical studies on leadership and regime building geared towards inclusive, integrative, 
and redistributive policy agendas in the 1990s and early 2000s. Only recently, authors like 
Marcuse et al. (2009), Fainstein (2010), or Hambleton (2015) restarted the discussion on just 
and inclusive cities. We took this newly launched research avenue as a motivation to 
investigate mayoral agendas in Swiss cities, and more in detail which of four different city 
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leadership styles result in urban policy agendas that embrace the most important elements 
defining just and inclusive cities, i.e. social integration and welfare issues, protection of the 
environment, state controlled housing markets or policies leading towards a limited growth 
of the city. 
Our results show that Swiss cities which care for policy agendas promoting an 
inclusive and just city are either led by cooperative and reproductive leaders – i.e. leaders 
belonging to the consensus facilitating style of leadership – or by authoritarian and strategic 
leaders that belong to the city boss category respectively. Leaders of the visionary 
(cooperative and strategic) and protector type (neither cooperative nor strategic) tend not to 
prioritise agenda issues that are critical for inclusive and just cities. 
There are however differences between the two leadership styles fostering inclusive 
city goals: Whereas cities with consensual mayors pursue agenda goals fostering integration, 
diversity and tolerance, cities with city boss leaders tend to prioritize either agenda goals 
leading to limited growth or to housing markets that are under a stronger control by the 
state. With a closer look on the political orientation of their leaders, we observe an additional 
positive impact of the consensual leadership style on social and welfare state issues in cities 
governed by centre-left mayors. The look at the political orientation of the mayors also 
brings a better understanding for the effect of the city boss style: with regard to housing 
intervention it is particularly the centre-left city bosses who deviate from their centre-left 
colleagues exposing other leadership styles; whereas with regard to limited growth agendas 
it is particularly the right-wing city bosses who deviate from their right-wing colleagues who 
display other styles of urban leadership. 
What can we learn from these results? First and foremost we see that inclusive city 
agendas are only observable in cities led by consensus or city boss mayors. That means that 
only cities that are led either in a cooperative and reproductive or in an a strategic and 
authoritarian manner include just city elements in their political agenda. Visionary Swiss 
cities thus tend to set policy agendas that are mainly geared towards non-intervention in 
housing markets and towards economic growth; a finding that confirms that Hambleton 
(2015) might indeed be biased for hope when encouraging more visionary urban leadership 
for achieving a more inclusive city. 
Secondly, integrative and social welfare state agenda goals need a leadership style 
based on cooperative elements to be pursued in Swiss cities – and the latter additionally a 
centre-left mayor. One possible explanation for that phenomenon is the need for cooperative 
collaboration with the political forces needed to defend present local integration and welfare 
programmes against the right-wing interests that are gaining political strength not only in 
suburban and rural areas, but also in many, mostly smaller and medium sized Swiss cities. 
Another reason for inclusive and social agenda goals that emerge together with a 
reproductive leadership style can be the mayor’s recognition of their political limits when it 
comes to additional development of inclusive political aims (as e.g. anti-growth strategies or 
state controlled housing) and thus want to reproduce their city’s social status quo after all. 
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A third lesson from our results is the sole appearance of anti-market ideas in combination 
with the authoritarian and strategic city boss leadership style. We interpret these results with 
the novelty of such ideas compared to the more common economic development ideas. 
Political claims that the market is not suited for organising housing in an appropriate way, or 
the idea of pursuing a political agenda that is not primarily focused on constant growth can 
thus only be made within a leadership style that bases on authority and strategy. The 
mayoral leadership needs to be authoritarian because cooperation would lead to conflicts 
with other, more conservative political forces or private market interests, and it needs to be 
strategic because such new ideas can only be developed by mayors that are able to think 
strategically and out of the box.  
We add a last comment concerning the right-wing city boss mayors fostering a 
political agenda that is not focused on economic growth. On the one hand, right wing 
mayors that prioritise a certain preservation of the status quo are quite easily imaginable. 
Thus, policy agendas towards limiting economic growth, or agendas that at least do not 
prioritise economic growth, are not that surprisingly taken by right-wing politicians. More 
interesting is the fact that there seems to be a need for strategic visions to enforce such a 
vision, what can be traced back to the strong predominance of contemporary liberal growth 
ideas. On the other hand, this result can be additionally interpreted in relation to the self-
perception of right-wing mayors when it comes to the description of their job profile. 
Elsewhere (see further Devecchi forthcoming 2016), we observed a strong narrative 
construction of strong and authoritarian city leadership (à la ‘L’état c’est moi!’) with the type 
of leadership which can be found predominantly in small and middle-sized enterprises. 
Leading a city in such a way may foster mayoral power in enforcing ‘alternative’ visions of 
limited growth. These consideration leads us to the thought that in contrast to Getimis’ and 
Hlepas’ (2006) definition of protective and city boss leadership, today’s actual preservation 
of the social, environmental and economic status quo can only be accomplished in cities led 
by strategic city bosses. Mayors that fall under the term of protectors because of lacking 
cooperative and strategic behaviour, would at least in the Swiss case better be termed 
‘maintenance’ mayors securing minimal public services and being to great extent dependent 
on private investment and initiative, which would correspond to an unfavourable 
‘dependent private bargaining context’ for the public sector vis-a-vis business actors (Savitch 
and Kantor 2002). 
Finally, we want to speculate about the possibilities how Swiss mayors caring about 
the just and inclusive city could successfully expand their agendas to make their city even 
more inclusive and just, i.e. with the prospects of adapting their leadership style by 
becoming both, strategic and cooperative. Such a shift in leadership style would let cities 
now led by conensual, and city boss leaders become ‘alternative’ visionary cities. This is to 
say because contemporary visionary cities in Switzerland generally opt, according to our 
results, for a policy agenda that is mainly based on neoliberal growth ideas. Their mayors 
thus do not use their cooperative and strategic leadership power to embrace broad inclusive 
policy agendas. We however argue that only cities that already pursue at least parts of the 
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inclusive city agenda are to be expected to develop them even broader in a sense that would 
fit Hambleton’s (2015) definition. This means that Swiss consensual mayors could 
incorporate the present agenda goals of their city boss counterparts with becoming more 
strategic, just as city bosses could extend their inclusive agenda when becoming more 
cooperative. The ‘alternative’ visionary mayor would thus incorporate integrative and social 
policies, as well as state controlled housing programmes, and policies that limit growth. 
Here the difficult question remains how, and whether at all Swiss consensual or city 
boss mayors can get momentum to gear their cities towards an even broader inclusive policy 
agenda. In particular, a closer interpretative look at cities belonging to the city boss-category 
can unravel their available possibilities to become more cooperative, and thus could 
strengthen their potential of generating stronger ‘alternative’ visions for integrative and 
social policies. To reach such goals, contemporary authoritarian leaders need to try to 
intensify new forms of local or inter-municipal cooperation. These could be established with 
the incorporation of local grassroots movements that share alternative visionary ideas, as e.g. 
housing cooperatives that are seeking land to build up integrative, innovative and cheaper 
forms of social housing which are better accessible for the less well-off. The establishment of 
such new cooperations are easily conceivable for centre-left mayors, whereas their 
emergence under right-wing mayors is less probable – even if right-wing politicians and 
alternative cooperatives could find each other in seeking solutions for a similar goal, namely 
the preservation of the status quo.  
On the other hand, Swiss cities led in a consensual style need a stronger strategic 
approach towards an anti-growth agenda and stronger interventionist housing policies to 
complement their integrative and social policy measures already set on the mayoral agenda. 
For smaller cities led by cooperative, but only reproductive leaders, it would be one possible 
option to increase the professionalisation of the local politico-administrative institutions, 
what can lead to broader and more strategic ways of local decision processes (in relation to 
professionalisation and local planning see Devecchi forthcoming 2016). A second option to 
foster strategic leadership – that would also be valid for bigger, and already professionalised 
cities – could be the widening of the already broad cooperation with surrounding 
municipalities, the establishment of inter-municipal learning processes, lobbying towards a 
stronger institutionalisation of regional political bodies (in relation to the effect of more 
professionalised regional/metropolitan institutions see Sager 2005), or strategic cooperations 
with other archetype cities in similar situations. 
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Appendix I: Additional regression table 
Table 2: Regression analysis for the mayoral agenda, centre-left vs. right political orientation 
 
Dependent variable: 
 
Social policies Integration Environment Econ. growth Housing 
 
OLS OLS OLS OLS logistic 
 
(1) 
Centre-
left 
(2) 
Rightist 
 
(3)  
Centre-
left 
(4)  
Rightist 
 
(5)  
Centre-
left 
(6)  
Rightist 
 
(7)  
Centre-
left 
(8)  
Rightist 
 
(9)  
Centre-
left 
(10)  
Rightist 
 
y> =Disagree 
        
-4.3 0.7 
         
(4.8) (6.6) 
y> =Neither  
        
-6.1 -0.1 
         
(4.8) (6.6) 
y> =Agree 
        
-8.2* -1.9 
         
(5.0) (6.6) 
y> =Strongly 
agree 
        
-11.4** -4.4 
        
(5.2) (6.6) 
Leadership 
style: 
          
 City Boss 2.0 1.2 1.4 0.9 -2.1 0.3 -1.7 -4.1*** -4.3*** -0.3 
 
(1.2) (1.7) (1.0) (1.3) (1.2) (1.5) (1.3) (1.5) (1.4) (1.2) 
 Consensus 
facilitator 
2.3** 0.3 1.0 1.2 0.9 0.6 -1.1 -1.1 -1.7 0.03 
(1.0) (1.3) (0.9) (1.0) (1.1) (1.2) (1.1) (1.1) (1.2) (0.8) 
 Protector 0.6 -0.2 -0.2 0.5 -1.1 1.2 0.5 -2.0* -0.6 -0.2 
 
(0.9) (1.2) (0.8) (1.0) (1.0) (1.1) (1.0) (1.1) (1.0) (0.8) 
 Visionary 
(reference 
category) 
          
Meetings with 
citizens/groups 
0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.2** -0.02 0.04 -0.1 0.02 -0.03 0.1 
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) 
Left-right 
selfpos.: 0-10 
-0.9*** 0.7 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.5 0.6 0.2 0.8** 0.9* 
(0.3) (0.6) (0.3) (0.5) (0.4) (0.6) (0.4) (0.5) (0.4) (0.5) 
Good financial 
situation 
-0.6 1.0 0.3 0.3 -0.1 1.0 0.2 -1.9** -1.2 -0.5 
(0.8) (0.9) (0.7) (0.8) (0.9) (0.8) (0.9) (0.8) (0.8) (0.7) 
Core city -0.4 -0.9 -0.4 -0.01 0.6 -0.4 1.2 2.1* -0.7 0.2 
 
(0.8) (1.3) (0.7) (1.1) (0.8) (1.2) (0.9) (1.2) (0.8) (0.9) 
Population (ln) 
-0.03 0.2 0.1 0.9 0.3 -0.8 0.4 0.5 0.6 -0.6 
(0.4) (0.9) (0.3) (0.7) (0.4) (0.8) (0.4) (0.8) (0.4) (0.6) 
German-
speaking 
0.1 -2.5* 1.0 0.4 -0.8 0.4 -0.5 0.5 1.1 1.6* 
(0.8) (1.4) (0.7) (1.1) (0.8) (1.2) (0.9) (1.2) (0.8) (0.9) 
Constant 14.6*** 4.7 9.2** -0.6 11.2** 20.2** 5.2 7.7 
  
 
(4.4) (9.2) (3.7) (7.5) (4.7) (8.2) (4.8) (8.1) 
  
Observations 36 42 36 42 36 42 36 42 37 44 
R2 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.2 
Adjusted R2 0.3 -0.04 0.02 0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.02 0.2 
  
Residual Std. 
Error 
1.9 (df =  
26) 
2.7 (df = 
32) 
1.6 (df = 
26) 
2.2 (df = 
32) 
2.0 (df = 
26) 
2.4 (df = 
32) 
2.1 (df = 
26) 
2.4 (df = 
32)   
F Statistic 
2.5** (df = 
9; 26) 
0.8 (df = 9; 
32) 
1.1 (df = 
9; 26) 
1.3 (df = 
9; 32) 
1.8 (df = 
9; 26) 
0.7 (df = 
9; 32) 
1.1 (df = 
9; 26) 
2.5** (df = 
9; 32)   
chi2 (df = 9) 
        
27.4*** 11.3 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Appendix II: Items used from the European Mayor Survey (registered 
for Switzerland in fall 2015) 
 
Remark: Swiss mayors could choose between a German, French and Italian survey form, 
online or in paper.  
 
1. Many different tasks are associated with the mayor’s position.  
How important do you think the following tasks are? 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
  
Not a task 
of the 
mayor 
Of little 
importance 
Of 
moderate 
importance 
Of great 
importance 
 
Of utmost 
importance 
(limit to 3 
answers 
please) 
To foster the co-operation with the neighbouring 
municipalities (cooperative) 
     
To manage the implementation of his/her personal 
policy choices (authoritarian) 
     
To encourage new projects in the community 
(strategic) 
     
To set goals for transforming the administrative 
structure (strategic) 
     
To ensure the correctness of the political-administrative 
process (reproductive) 
     
To guide the staff in day to day activities 
(reproductive) 
     
 
Remark by the authors: The dimension cooperative-authoritarian was calculated by averaging 
the value of the item indicating cooperative style and the inverse value of the item indicating 
an authoritarian style. For dichotomization of this dimension we used the average of the 
Swiss mayors as a cleavage point. Analogously the reproductive-strategic dimension was 
calculated as an average of the strategic items and the inverse of the reproductive items. A 
similar approach was followed by Getimis and Hlepas (2006, 182). 
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3. Below are a number of challenges that many municipalities are facing. For each challenge please 
indicate the degree to which it is an important priority on the policy agenda of you as a mayor during 
your current term of office.   
A score of 1 indicates a “Low priority” and a score of 5  indicates  the “High priority”. 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
  
1  
Low 
priorit
y 
2 3 4 
5  
High 
priorit
y 
A To increase the attractiveness of the municipality as a place of business and a place for 
people to live in, by regeneration and development projects, new cultural facilities, 
improvement of the aesthetics of the city, etc. 
     
B To develop social policies to secure adequate housing, health care, education, public 
transport facilities and take care of the needs of vulnerable groups (the elderly, the young, 
the unemployed etc.) 
     
C To protect the natural environment and secure the responsible use of natural resources      
D  To secure public safety, fight crime and secure law and order      
E To address politico-administrative issues, e.g. in order to improve relations with citizens, 
better and more efficient services, securing integrity and fighting corruption, etc. 
     
F  To preserve the local identity and the locality’s traditional lifestyle      
G  To stimulate economic growth and employment      
H  To improve communal infrastructure, communication and transport       
I To improve the integration of ethnic, religious or cultural minorities and emphasize 
diversity and tolerance in the local community 
     
 
9. How many hours do you  spend each week in the following activities?   
 
14. How would describe the financial situation of your municipality? 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
Very poor Poor Neither good nor poor  Good  Very good 
     
 
meetings with council and executive board  hours/week 
meetings with administrative staff  hours/week 
meetings with citizens, groups, etc (as share of hours spent in total)  hours/week 
ceremonial and representative functions in the Town Hall (weddings, register 
activities, receptions…) 
 hours/week 
public debates and conferences outside the Town Hall  hours/week 
field visits (official and unofficial) in the city  hours/week 
meetings with authorities from other cities  hours/week 
meetings with authorities from the region, national government  hours/week 
individual preparation for the duties of the mayor  hours/week 
political party meetings  hours/week 
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18. On the basis of your experience as a mayor, how much do you agree with the following statements? 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
  
 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
The market is the best way to attend housing needs      
 
There is often talk about a left-right dimension in politics. Where would you place yourself on a left-right 
dimension? 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
  
Left 
0 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Right  
10 
             
 
 
